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Social Conservatives’ Adoption of a Subaltern 
Discourse After the 2012 US Presidential Election 




Mitt Romney’s defeat in the 2012 Presidential Election led to rampant speculation, 
both within and outside of the Republican Party, that President Obama’s victory 
required the GOP to re-evaluate its platform, leaders, and future. Some groups 
amongst the Republican coalition, specifically the Evangelical Christians, believe the 
electoral loss carries deeper meaning. They see the Democratic Party’s general success 
as a sign of America being ‘lost’. In response to the election, Evangelicals have formed 
a counter-public based on a narrative of defeat to increase its cohesiveness thus 
defining its political identity. Beyond politically defining Evangelical Christians, this 
report will inspect Pastors’ speeches, TV personalities’ testimonies, newspaper 
editorials, and previous studies regarding the 2012 election and stances on relevant 
issues to determine who is promoting this idea of a ‘lost’ America and why they 
stubbornly maintain this sentiment. Consideration of Evangelical sources will highlight 
their reasons for increasingly feeling morally threatened and politically trapped. While 
previous works have stressed the power held by Evangelical groups, this study will 




After the 2012 US Presidential election, an unexpectedly large victory by President 
Barack Obama sparked a Republican internal investigation into the causes of their political 
defeat. The official ‘autopsy’ report produced by the Republican National Committee identified 
several policy stances that required a reform. The Party’s positions on social issues, for example, 
have been questioned. More specifically, many have demanded a shift away from conservative 
beliefs regarding hot-button social items such as abortion and gay marriage. Previously 
considered one of the strengths of the party, the evangelical or socially conservative wing of the 
Republican coalition has been alienated as a result of their stubborn adherence to strict moral 
principles amidst a wave of secularization. Thus, the majority of evangelicals, when regarded as 
a political entity, have become a subculture defined by both a narrative of defiance to policy 
changes and by a narrative based on America’s moral defeat. However, those who identify with 
the faction dispute any notion that suggests the social conservatives have embraced a 
subordinate position within the Republican Party. This stance contradicts at least one definition 
of a counterpublic. Citing their historical political significance to the GOP, notable socially 
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conservative figures demand recognition of their ideals in the platform or threaten the creation 
of a new party. By means of studying firsthand accounts from pastors, TV personalities, and 
politicians this study will politically define this counterculture. Then, it will analyze its leaders, 
their narratives, and the effects induced by these messages on their electoral standing.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Analysis of the media produced by the Religious Right reveals their similarities to a 
counterculture, as defined by Michael Warner. Unlike other papers, this study will view the 
social conservatives as more than just a political faction. Utilizing Warner’s perception of a 
counterculture, one begins to see how the evangelicals closely meet his model. In the same way, 
while others focus on the day-by-day messaging conveyed by the 24-hour news cycle, 
consideration of the group’s narratives as a whole will be taken into account. The inclusion of 
eclectic sources – debate transcripts, editorials, TV show segments, and Ministers’ emails – 
further distinguishes this paper from other documents. As an author of Publics and 
Counterpublics, Warner stresses three points when defining a counterpublic: the circulation of 
texts, the tension with the larger public, and the idea of being cognizant of their subordination.1 
Although the social conservatives’ adoption of a subaltern discourse adheres to the first two 
requirements assigned by Warner, only a small portion of this unit has embraced the idea of 
being an inferior body. As previously stated, throughout the post-election turmoil eminent social 
conservatives have maintained a narrative of opposition to policy shifts and a narrative rooted in 
America’s decreasing respect for Christian principles. Defining the sources of and motivations 
for these messages will be the primary focus of this paper. Nevertheless, the paper will also 
expose how the majority of the GOP’s most traditional members refuse to accept the 
subordination clause included in Warner’s definition of a counterpublic. Numerous accounts 
suggest that one division feels that the evangelicals have already passed their political prime and 
will continue to have increasingly less influence. This sentiment, which aligns with Warner’s 
vision of counterpublics, stands in stark contrast to the rest of the social conservatives who still 
feel they possess political power.  
 
HOW SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES COMPARE TO WARNER’S DEFINITION 
Contrary to Warner’s idea that countercultures acknowledge their secondary position, 
many of the most influential social conservatives feel they still have the ability to significantly 
impact the political sphere. Their denial, however, has only strengthened the group’s resolve and 
unity. Abstaining from change has given the social conservative movement more power by 
further detaching them from the main Republican bloc. Admonishment by the leadership of the 
Republican Party has failed to produce the desired changes in the social conservatives’ beliefs. 
Subsequently, the narrative of a ‘lost’ America and of adamant conservatism preached by 
various leaders has expedited the development of a social conservative counterculture. 
According to Warner, a counterpublic is at least partially defined by its tension with the larger 
public and is “mediated by print, theater, diffuse networks of talk, commerce, and the like.”2 
Media produced by the faction confirms that social conservatives meet these two characteristics. 
Consideration of the thousands of Megachurches, the plethora of talk radio channels, and of the 
ever-expanding reach of TV programs all devoted to the social conservative cause makes it clear 
how such a united, identifiable counterpublic has been formed. Such a large media empire 
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allows for the diffusion of communication necessitated by Warner’s interpretation. Likewise, 
Christian groups’ feelings of oppression as a result of general condemnation for views deemed as 
insensitive speak to their identification as a group with plenty of external tension. To Nancy 
Fraser, the social conservatives likely resemble a “subaltern counterpublic” where “members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.”3 Fraser denotes the centrality of 
counterdiscourses to counterpublics - a theme that will be appearing frequently below. While 
one could debate exactly which term best defines the movement, it seems clear the social 
conservatives represent a subset of the public committed to an alternative ideology. Even so, 
Warner’s instance on counterpublic subordination means his definition fails to entirely embody 
this group. Both the narratives shared via and the actions taken by Religious Right organizers 
emphasize the political power and internal solidarity generated by denying subordinate status. 
Their collective action at the polls as well as their commitment to consuming and sharing media 
that propagates the narratives of both American moral defeat and defiance to change has 
sufficiently severed ties with the majority of the population. In the same way, the social 
conservatives’ denial of a lesser role in the GOP has bolstered the group’s identity as a 
counterpublic. 
 
THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES 
Demographics taken from election results, census data, and Pew Polls suggest this 
counterpublic does wield considerable influence. These results further detach the social 
conservatives from Warner’s idea of subordinate status. Modern media has labeled this political 
counterculture as the ‘social conservatives’: a term, which primarily encompasses those within 
the evangelical sect of Christianity as well as people against progressive positions on social 
issues. Others frequently use the term ‘Religious Right’ to refer to the same movement. Election 
data provide a relatively clear picture on how social conservatives vote and who represents a 
part of their constituency. According to The Economist, over half of Republicans identify as 
evangelical but not all of these voters belong in the ‘social conservative’ category. Amongst those 
labeled as evangelicals in exit polls, 44 percent of those under the age of 40 defined their social 
views as ‘liberal.’4 Hence, not all evangelicals, especially younger members, are a part of the 
movement. Additionally, the group appears to have limited participation by non-white 
evangelicals. Immigration has increasingly led to the inclusion of minorities in evangelical 
counts, which has dramatically altered the demographics of the sect. Once again the electoral 
results make the exact delineations more explicit. Analysis of Protestants’ votes, of which 
evangelicalism resides within, confirms the need to include race when defining social 
conservatives. Approximately 90 percent of black Protestants voted for Obama, in stark contrast 
to the 70 percent of white Protestants who supported Romney.5 The Pew Research Center data 
from May 2011 includes the following demographical breakdown of those who view themselves 
as staunch conservatives: 56 percent male, eight percent under the age of 30, 31 percent 
between the ages of 30 and 49, 61 percent over the age of 50, and 92 percent white. In terms of 
geography, 38 percent of staunch conservatives reside in the South.6 Unfortunately, this report 
does not directly distinguish between staunch fiscal and staunch social conservatives. Gallup 
poll data from May 2012 suggests economically conservative citizens do not necessarily possess 
socially conservative views as well. Poll results show 38 percent of Americans identify as total 
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social conservatives while 46 percent view themselves as economically conservative.7 As a 
consequence, the Pew statistics only provide a general idea of the make-up of the social 
conservative movement. In terms of geography though, a different Pew survey demonstrates the 
prevalence of the ‘Evangelical Protestant Tradition’ in Southern states. For example, over 51 
percent of US adults in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Tennessee view themselves as part of the 
evangelical movement.8 These figures confirm the group’s Southern orientation. Data compiled 
for the spring 2008 primaries demands that one additionally considers religious traditionalism. 
Clear differences can be seen in Protestants’ positional stances based on whether they identify as 
traditionalists, centrists, or modernists. For example, when asked if same-sex marriage should 
be legal, nine percent of traditionalists agreed, 26 percent of those in the center assented, and 42 
percent of modernists supported the initiative.9 Despite the age of this survey, religious 
traditionalism must factor into a definition of social conservatism. Above all else, the election 
results highlight the uniformity of the social conservatives. This collection of individuals 
displayed remarkable solidarity in the 2012 Presidential election as 80 percent of white 
evangelicals voted for Mitt Romney.10 In summary, the social conservative movement 
predominantly comprises elderly, Republican, white, traditionalist or centrist Protestants 
(especially evangelicals), who likely reside in the South, and may or may not hold economically 
conservative values as well. For comparison, Robert Jones, in his book Progressive and 
Religious, defines the Christian Right as “…a fairly homogeneous group dominated by white 
evangelical Protestants concentrated in the South and Midwest…”11 Both definitions highlight 
the significance of age, religion, and geography when defining the faction. Additionally, each 
definition provides evidence that urges one to view the social conservatives as a counterpublic 
due to their lack of diversity and general exclusiveness. 
 
HISTORY OF THE FACTION 
After becoming nationally relevant, cohesiveness during elections has, to this day, led to 
social conservatives shedding the subordinate status associated with most counterpublics. In the 
past, the faction likely yield greater influence on national campaigns but now, they possess the 
ability to shape Republican races. Prior to the 1980s, a period in which several national figures 
utilized their close ties with the social conservatives to propel themselves into office, Ed Dobson, 
an evangelical pastor, said, “Evangelicals were considered obscurantist, sweat-drenched 
Appalachian hillbillies.” However, as Frank Lambert notes in Religion in American Politics, 
“Though fundamentalists had been barely visible in national public affairs over the previous 
several decades, they had been far from idle.”12 Support from Ronald Reagan, during his 
campaign and after he assumed the Presidency, and the apparent secularization of the American 
government, as reportedly evidenced by the Roe v. Wade ruling, led to evangelical leaders using 
their pulpit politically. GOP leaders sought to organize these social conservatives to broaden 
their coalition, as many of them had previously voted for Democrats.13 “The basis for the 
coalition,” according to Kenneth Wade, author of Politics and Religion, “would be a frontal 
attack on ‘big government’ as a threat to the traditional religious and economic values.”14 After 
initially dealing with politics at the national level, the social conservative movement gained 
immense power through the implementation of an extensive grassroots network.15 However, by 
the 2012 election cycle, the movement had reached its zenith in terms of national sway. Jeff 
Zeleny of The New York Times detailed in his article “Iowa May Turn G.O.P.’s Focus to Social 
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Issues” how the social conservative movement’s focus on social issues in a time of economic 
uncertainty threatened to get Republican Presidential candidates off-message. Zeleny 
summarizes:  
social and religious conservatives are pressing the likely candidates on issues like 
same-sex marriage and abortion rather than on jobs, the budget deficit and other 
economic concerns that leaders of both parties expect to dominate the general 
election.16 
Similar articles stressing the social conservative movement’s stubborn refusal to ignore social 
issues occurred frequently in newspapers across the nation prior to the election. A Gallup poll 
from October 10 demonstrates how the social conservatives’ failure to be flexible has led to their 
isolation both nationally and within the Republican Party. Only 44 percent of Americans 
thought the government “should promote traditional values in our society.” Within the 
Republican Party, 65 percent denoted their desire for traditional values - down from 79 percent 
in 2004.17 So although this section of the GOP has become less dominant in determining general 
elections, the subaltern counterpublic has perpetuated its pull in Republican primary elections. 
 
 ‘TENSION WITHIN THE LARGER PUBLIC’ FOLLOWING THE 2012 ELECTION 
 Social conservatives, as seen by their narratives and population data, undoubtedly 
adhere to the section of Warner’s definition that couples counterpublics to tension with society 
at large. Evidence from polls and the election show an electorate embracing secular beliefs. Such 
a transition has motivated the Republican Party leadership to question if the social 
conservatives still have a place within their party. Months prior to the 2012 election, a USA 
Today survey found “only 38 percent of the registered voters said social issues like gay marriage 
and abortion are extremely or very important to them in the context of the presidential 
campaign.”18 Statistics like these, in addition to Romney’s loss, sparked the generation of an 
election autopsy report. A five-member panel of the Republican National Committee created the 
document, titled “The Growth and Opportunity Project.” Released in December, the project 
outlined potential changes to the Republican platform to improve its relationship with a 
diversifying electorate. Included changes such as a more favorable stance on immigration, 
consideration of maneuvering on gay marriage, and several alterations to the Presidential 
primary procedure have been widely regarded as attempts to marginalize the social 
conservatives in the party.19 Former Oklahoma Congressman Mickey Edwards supports the calls 
for primaries designed to produce more moderate candidates. While speaking at an Intelligence 
Squared US debate, he said, “It's the primary system where the Republican activist, the true 
believers, people like you [a social conservative] show up. And what happens is you end up with 
nominees like Christine O'Donnell…” He goes on to say that radicals running for office is “what’s 
killing the party.”20 Such a change obviously angers social conservatives who believe their 
candidates represent winnable politicians. Similarly, public figures such as Rick Santorum 
equate potential Republican acceptance of gay marriage with assured electoral defeat as well as 
an invitation to create a new political party.21 Thus, the social conservative movement has come 
full circle - apolitical prior to the radical 1960s, extremely politically powerful throughout the 
1980s and early 2000s, and now a tumor within the Republican Party. Attacks from “the 
Establishment” on the social conservatives did not stop with the publication of the report. 
Perennial Republican Karl Rove, widely regarded as a highly influential party member, 
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sponsored the development of the Conservative Victory Project. Tired of losing seemingly 
winnable races because of primaries producing extremist Republicans, Rove’s project, in the 
words of Kevin Cirilli of Politico, sought to, “…go after certain conservative grass roots efforts.”22 
Beyond being blamed by many Republicans for spoiling their chance at the White House, the 
“establishment” now seems to be actively trying to prevent social conservatives from even 
running for political office. These accounts demonstrate the dramatic and ongoing separation of 
social conservatives from the main players in the Republican Party. In the past, the group 
primarily only struggled with non-Republicans while the GOP found a way to include them in 
the conservative battle. “Establishment” attacks confirm that social conservatives now have to 
worry about isolation from the GOP as well. Additionally, the attacks represent how 2012 served 
as a landmark cycle in regards to the formation of a social conservative counterpublic. 
 
CONTINUED EXAMPLES OF SEPARATION  
The strain on the GOP-social conservative relationship serves as excellent evidence for 
the separation component of the counterpublic definition. Recent cultural events have deepened 
the divide between the two coalitions. As immigration reform and the discussion on gay 
marriage have gained national media coverage in the aftermath of the election, the wedge 
dividing the ideology camps has significantly deepened. For some on both sides complete 
separation represents the only viable option. David Brooks, columnist for The New York Times, 
envisions a GOP division occurring along geographical lines, creating a coastal and Midwestern 
party in addition to a Southern and Western party. He views this as a necessary step in making 
the Republican message relevant again in a period in which they have lost the popular vote in 
five of the last six Presidential elections.23 Others believe the divisional fence should be drawn 
according to policy lines as seen by younger Republicans’ more favorable stance towards Ohio 
Senator Ron Portman’s support of gay marriage.24 For example, one writer, Mark Chaves, 
rejected his evangelical base in his youth as a result of its affiliation with rigid conservative 
policies. Chaves now checks unaffiliated when asked for his religious status because of the 
group’s perception of gay marriage and the general LGBT community.25 For fifty years, in Daniel 
William’s view, author of God’s Own Party, social conservatives have maintained close ties to the 
Republican Party “because the GOP shared their vision of a ‘Christian’ nation resolutely 
defending itself against internal and external enemies.”26 Given that voters have questioned the 
GOP’s devotion to the maintenance of a strict ‘Christian’ nation, how will the Republican Party 
respond? Will shifts toward the center on social issues increase their standing with 
independents or destroy their base? Members of the Republican team, such as former 
Republican Senator John Danforth, seek to free the party from the Religious Right’s 
conservative tug. An ordained Episcopal minister, Danforth is, according to Lambert, “critical of 
the Religious Right primarily because of what he considers to be its negative influence on the 
GOP.”27 The social conservative response to questions of this sort has been consistent - though 
the times may be changing, sticking to conservative principles will provide the GOP with the 
easiest path to victory. Such a position, founded upon the idea of political power, again shows 
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RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ MEDIA EMPIRES AND THE CIRCULATION OF TEXTS 
Various media networks, espoused by religious figures, facilitate the spread of literature 
crucial to the survival of a subaltern discourse. Broadcasts of the leaders’ responses to the 2012 
election represent the social conservative narrative that America, with its morality in steep 
decline, has become ‘lost’. Their dedication to their core beliefs has increasingly made them a 
counterculture in the American political universe. Using email, TV, editorials, and speeches to 
convey their narrative, this isolationist approach has solidified their power over the Republican 
Party’s future due to the loyalty exhibited by their followers. In Religion in America, Lambert 
summarizes, “Dissatisfied with the mainstream media that Conservative Christians believed 
expressed humanist ideas and ridiculed Christian principles, the Religious Right has developed 
an alternative media that advances their views.”28 In addition to normal media, reverends have 
the unique ability to connect with voters during a special time in their week: Sabbath. Mega-
churches, almost entirely Protestant, have made an increasingly large political impact as the 
number of churches (with at least 2,000 attendees) has soared from 50 in 1970 to 1,300 in 
2009.29 Progressive & Religious describes the social conservatives’ prominent media presence. 
Author Robert Jones cites James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family (FOF), as an example 
of the networks many reverends have established. With 2.3 million magazine subscribers, a 
radio program carried by more stations than National Public Radio, and more monthly readers 
than The New York Times Dobson possess a media empire.30 Such an empire can have an 
extensive impact on the electoral process. Some, like Daniel Williams, speculate that access to a 
portion of this network allowed Mike Huckabee to win a number of early primaries in the 2008 
election cycle. Williams points out that Huckabee received the emails of 414,000 young 
evangelicals in Iowa from a local evangelical leader prior to the state’s primary: a contest he 
won.31 This substantial contact sheet emphasizes the power of access to such a tight network of 
voters. These networks also aid with political messaging. Immediately following the 2012 
Presidential Election, Ted Haggard, an evangelical Pastor with immense popularity, used his 
blog to comment on the disappointing loss. Rather than acknowledge Obama’s well-run 
campaign or Romney’s inability to connect with average voters, Haggard said, “I think Obama 
won the election primarily because his culture was more appealing to most Americans.” 
Haggard claims Americans embraced Obama’s past use of drugs and alcohol and that specific 
political positions “were not the determining factors in the election.”32 In the opinion of people 
like Haggard, Americans no longer prioritize strong morals contributing to the nation’s 
deterioration. Refusing to change his political views in correspondence with the majority of 
Americans, Haggard also embodies the message centered upon defiance to policy change. 
Reverend Albert Mohler Jr., President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, shares 
Haggard’s disappointment in American morality. In an interview shortly after the election, 
Reverend Mohler used the opportunity to start building upon the narrative of a ‘lost’ America. 
Acknowledging that they did get their anti-abortion, anti-same-sex marriage message out, he 
laments, “An increasingly secularized America understands our positions, and has rejected 
them.”33 Instead of perceiving the electoral loss as a sign of required reform, these central social 
conservative figures have used the results as a symbol of American moral depravity. Ralph Reed, 
an early leader in the Christian Coalition, renounces efforts by ‘the Establishment’ to moderate 
its stance to increase voter appeal. Displaying the movement’s rebellious attitude, Reed argues, 
“We’ve been hearing the same old song [for change] for 30 years.”34 Additionally, Reed founded 
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Families of Faith, an organization that has worked tirelessly to promote the narratives of 
America needing ‘saving’ and the importance of remaining steadfast in support of conservative 
principles. At an April 2013 debate with David Brooks, Reed gave an explicit vision of the 
Republican Party from a social conservative’s perspective. “The fact of the matter is what the 
Republican Party stands for, what it fights for and what it seeks to advance,” in Reed’s opinion, 
“is policies that will strengthen marriage, family, childbearing and rearing.”35 According to Reed, 
the GOP is synonymous with conservative principles, a distinction increasingly at odds with the 
rest of the Party’s members. Clearly, to social conservatives, the GOP must play a role in 
rescuing America from moral decline. This objective conveys how these narratives are heavily 
based on social conservatives having a persistent role in American political discourse. The 
necessity of a vibrant Religious Right serves as the movement’s reasoning behind rejecting 
subordination.   
 
THE MEDIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISPERSAL OF THE NARRATIVES 
A narrative based on a ‘lost’ America has taken hold throughout social conservative 
camps and has further alienated them by preventing them from shifting their views. So although 
the majority of Americans, according to a Wall Street Journal poll from March 2013, now 
support gay marriage and legalized abortions in most cases, social conservatives will not 
budge.36 TV personalities have assumed this defiant narrative as well. The dissemination of 
these narratives over another media outlet illustrates the wide reach of the social conservatives’ 
circulation of ideas. Depressed by the Presidential election defeat, Mike Huckabee issued a 
statement to his attentive social conservative audience through his blog, podcast, and radio 
outlets. Like the evangelical ministers, Huckabee purports America’s primary problems are 
spiritual but that as a body, social conservatives must not give up the fight. He urges his 
followers to “…gear up and get ready for the next battle. That’s what we do as people of faith and 
a party of principle. We don’t stop believing what we believe. We do a better job of doing what 
we’re supposed to do. That is how you save America from herself.”37 In this message Huckabee 
reinforces the narratives of both defeat and defiance through his stubborn refusal to accept an 
America with ‘immoral’ standards. According to Huckabee, American can be ‘saved’ but it will 
require the social conservative movement to stick to its principles and remain cohesive. To prove 
his recognition of the Religious Right as vital body, Huckabee asserts that they still have the 
potential to alter America’s course. Likewise, Bill O’Reilly has used his position as a Fox News 
TV personality to share the narrative of America’s moral defeat and the duty of Republicans to 
prevent it. Pew data from May 2011 state that a remarkable 54 percent of all staunch 
conservatives regularly watch Fox News.38 Such a connected audience undoubtedly helps TV 
personalities spread their message. Analysis of O’Reilly’s show helps to further define the social 
conservative narrative. He urges his viewers to “…convince younger Americans, minorities and 
apathetic people of which there are plenty that the country is heading for disaster.” Focusing on 
minorities, the young, and the unreligious, O’Reilly demonstrates the movement’s inability to 
communicate with a large portion of the population. Such a narrow, albeit focused, reach helps 
clarify the origin of the movement’s tenseness with several American demographics.  
Both Huckabee and O’Reilly rely on dramatic rhetoric to keep their followers dedicated 
to the cause. Religious figures cite the prospect of going to Hell as motivation to preach 
conservative values. On The Bill O’Reilly Factor episode covering the apparent culture war 
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raging in the United States, O’Reilly presents another apparently awful possibility: “If 
traditional people don’t begin standing up we will become Sweden. No question about it.”39 To 
social conservative leaders there is no middle ground: America will either be saved or damned to 
Sweden-hood. A notorious radio personality, Rush Limbaugh, shares O’Reilly’s concern 
regarding American morality. Using the same polarizing diction as O’Reilly, Limbaugh worries 
that the Obama administration seeks “to effectively erase the 2,000 years of Judeo-Christian 
values as a governing force, as a positive influence on cultures and society.”40 Statements like 
this solidify the idea of America being forced away from its Christian base. Progressives seized 
the White House and now threaten to destroy the Christian role in the US government. These 
TV personalities have fully embraced both narratives, which ensure their pious followers will as 
well. 
 
POLITICIAN’S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT LESS INFLUENCE 
Elected officials advanced the narratives and continually voice their faith in the social 
conservative’s ability to make a difference. Disregarding the polls and statistics, Presidential 
candidate Rick Santorum asserts, “If we had candidates in the last two presidential elections 
who weren’t ashamed of the positions they had on these issues and played offense, instead of 
listening to the same people who now want to abandon the issues, we would’ve been 
successful.”41 Calling for Republicans to stand up to those opposed to their moral beliefs, 
Santorum personifies the social conservatives’ rejection of any suggestion to alter their 
principles. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Senator’s remarks indicate that social conservative 
leaders have spurned subordinate status. Lindsay Graham, an influential Republican senator, 
recently displayed the difficultly ‘the Establishment’ is having with the social conservatives. As 
Ed O’Keefe reported, Graham has allowed the faction to maintain its narrative. Although 
Graham did ask the Religious Right to re-word their messaging at a recent Republican meeting 
in South Carolina, he admitted that members of the far right “don’t have to be embarrassed 
about [their] social conservatism.”42 As the election results suggest, the GOP’s platform could 
apply to a broader cross-section of Americans if the whole party allowed for slightly more 
progressive stances. However, the narrative of defiance and defeat defines the Religious Right, 
leaving the rest of the party with few options. GOP politicians from the House to the Senate have 
failed to persuade the coalition to consider any other narrative. Recently, Herman Cain, a 
Republican Presidential candidate, made the group’s defiance explicit. Immediately after the 
election results became official, Cain encouraged the creation of a third party of true 
conservatives. His idea represents the devotion of the movement to retaining its ideological 
base. Cain’s support of such a drastic measure emphasizes the Religious Right’s zealousness and 
confidence in their timeless political impact. Reverends, personalities, and politicians have 
utilized the same strategies in developing the narrative. Echoing O’Reilly’s dire predictions, 
Texas Senator Ted Cruz said the movement has the choice between “surrendering or standing up 
now to defend our liberty.” This statement led to massive rounds of applause at the Conservative 
Political Action Conference signifying the general receptiveness towards an uncompromising 
path forward.43 These politicians likely remember how well this narrative worked in the 2004 
election. “I Vote Values” embodied the narrative of defiance and defeat for the Republican Party 
in 2004. The phrase painted an image of an American in need of superior values and signified 
Republican refusal to place social matters on the political back burner. Author Robert Jones had 
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an interesting interpretation of the strategy. For Jones, “The genius of this bold plan was to 
brazenly claim all of religion and morality for one party and to radically contract the scope of 
these terms to a few narrow wedge issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and embryonic 
stem cell research.”44 It appears social conservatives still consider the use of the same plan vital 
to ‘saving’ America. Just as they did when fighting for George W. Bush’s re-election, social 
conservatives have relied on a negative narrative to inspire action. Wald mirrors this sentiment 
when he argues that Republican candidates rely on social conservatives to turn out at the polls. 
GOP politicians have, as Wald observed, sought the traditionalist vote by implementing their 
narrative. “By blaming liberal programs…for breaking down family structure, fueling a rise in 
crime, and undermining the social order,” Wald thinks, “Republican campaign themes have 
echoed the language of the Christian right.”45 The idea of a collapsing social structure based on 
family values represents the core essence of both the narrative of America’s defeat and the need 
to fight for conservative ideals. The past successes of the social conservatives may explain why 
most have not accepted the idea of being beneath any governmental faction. Political scientist 
Matthew Moen concurs that the Religious Right’s adoption of ‘victimization’ rhetoric has been 
used “as a clever and calculated ploy to tap the reservoir of positive sentiment for victims of 
American society.”46 These leaders have efficiently delivered this message to millions and 
include heated diction to ensure that their followers and the American public take the message 
seriously. Likewise, stressing the public’s need for salvation courtesy of the social conservatives, 
organizers of the movement have successfully woven the theme of political relevancy into their 
narratives. 
 
HOW EVERYDAY SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES ADOPTED THE NARRATIVES 
Common social conservatives also promote both narratives. They bolster the narratives 
through their undying support for conservative politicians, solely watching Fox News, and 
buying their reverend’s books, magazines, and podcasts. When NBA player Nick Collins came 
out as the first declared homosexual athlete in the league, it led to more people questioning the 
evangelical stance towards the LGBT community. However, for typical social conservatives, 
“their sense of persecution,” according to John Blake of CNN, “goes beyond their stance of 
homosexuality.” Blake’s recent article outlines how the narrative of opposition to policy 
alterations amidst America’s secularization has clearly led to the augmentation of pressure with 
the public. A few organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, have even labeled 
evangelical groups like the Family Research Council as “hate groups.”47 This serves as an 
example of the extreme tension that has increasingly manifested itself through cultural events. 
In response to these harsh distinctions, leaders have continually maintained the need to fight 
back in this cultural war.  
 
SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES WHO FEEL SUBORDINATE 
Others take the narrative of defeat to the next level; they view America’s secularization as 
foreshadowing the end of social conservatives’ political influence. In essence, they accept the 
subordination generally assigned to countercultures. Writing a month after the election, John S. 
Dickerson, an evangelical Pastor from Arizona, tried to summarize the effect of the religious 
right on voters. Unlike many, he felt social conservatives had little impact on the Republican 
primaries or the general election. Furthermore, the fundamental changes in American culture 
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suggests “…that the structural supports of evangelism are quivering…” Dickerson mentions an 
aging congregation, failure to react to cultural shifts, and shrinking church attendance as 
indicators of evangelicalism’s inability to ever return to the political height it reached in 2004.  
Opposing Warner’s model, most other social conservatives remain steadfast in their belief that 
they can reclaim the political high ground, assuming they do not stray from the righteousness-
based path they have frequently followed. In his summary, Dickerson asserts, “Strategies that 
served evangelicals well just 15 years ago are now self-destructive. The more that evangelicals 
attempt to correct the course, the more they splinter their movement. In coming years we will 
see the old evangelicalism whimper and wane.”48 Although many, such as Dickerson, have 
suggested that evangelism as a political force will end sooner rather than later, Chris Hedges’ 
investigation into the movement suggests otherwise. Hedges points out, “But within this mass of 
divergent, factitious and varied group [of evangelicals] is this core group of powerful Christian 
dominationists who have latched on to the despair, isolation, disconnectedness and fear that 
drives many people into these churches.”49 Similarly to Dickerson, Hedges tends to disagree 
with the social conservative movement’s narratives, but his analysis references the continual 
strength produced by their negative message. 
 
POWER GARNERED FROM STUBBORNESS 
Appeasing Republican leadership by becoming a lesser player and willingly submitting to 
the findings of the Growth and Opportunity Project would likely help Republicans nationally 
compete for independent voters. However, the acceptance and spread of the two related 
narratives mentioned above has given the social conservative movement power as a result of 
their unity. Writing for The Washington Post, Greg Sargent mentions, “Social conservatives 
remain a large and powerful part of the Republican coalition. They provide donors and 
volunteers, and they are the driving push behind the GOP’s nationwide effort to pass state-level 
abortion restrictions…”50 Sargent’s analysis displays the utility of the social conservatives to the 
larger Republican movement. Similarly, Ralph Reed questions those Republicans who want to 
“give the cold shoulder to evangelicals and other voters of faith who make up the overwhelming 
majority of their voters.”51 Although some debate just how influential evangelicals are on 
election results, losing the social conservative faction would likely injure the Republican Party’s 
numbers. Through studying the research of Sociologist Kenneth Wald, Lambert came to the 
same conclusion. While some evidence does suggest evangelicals make an impact on how people 
vote, “perhaps the biggest impact of the Religious Right is voter turnout.”52 To Lambert and 
many others, social conservative consensus and democratic participation fuels their political 
power. 
 
SUMMARY OF SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE’S HOSTORY 
The social conservative movement represents a body of primarily white, older 
evangelical individuals affiliated with the Republican Party who reside in the South. After 
gaining political influence in the 1970s, the group has increasingly played a role in determining 
Republican platforms and Presidential candidates. However, their staunch refusal to allow for 
the secularization of the party in accordance with the general US population has led to creation 
of a counterpublic within the greater Republican Party. Social conservatives acknowledge their 
subordinate status but have bound together as a result of the circulation of common ideas from 
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Reverend to media to politician. Some blamed the group for Mitt Romney’s loss as well as 
dismal performances in a number of Senate races, which fostered the development of two 
narratives within the social conservative coalition. More specifically, representatives of social 
conservatism at churches, on the airwaves, and in Washington D.C. have created a narrative of a 
‘lost’ America that requires saving which their movement can provide if they keep their values.  
 
FUTURE OF SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES 
The next election should show whether the leaders of the social conservative movement, 
in choosing to steadfastly remain true to their stances on social issues, selected the correct 
course of action. In the short term, the maintenance of the narrative of moral defeat and of 
defiance has bolstered the movement’s solidarity and electoral importance in a time of external 
pressure to conform to new American values. While other groups may have taken the prescribed 
route of subordination, social conservatives have relied on their narratives to prove why they 
matter. Lambert maintains that both religionists and secularists alike often “oppose the 
exclusivism of any group that purports to speak for all Americans on moral issues.”53 This 
analysis implies that social conservatives will undoubtedly face steep challenges as they try to 
lead all Americans in the culture war. Recent Republican history demonstrates the difficulty 
associated with denying the wants of the social conservatives. In 1992, the GOP faced a similar 
situation: they had the opportunity to create a new image for the Party while creating its official 
platform. In the words of the authors of The God Strategy, they choose to, “…mobilize the base 
of the religious conservatives that had been built over the past 12 years.”54 Arguably, the social 
conservative base is even broader today; will the Party side with them again?  
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